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Introduction  
Over the last decade there have been a number of examinations of the use of police resources, and 
issues of public safety, which included questions of how to provide for the same excellence in 
policing expected of a 21st century service, whilst managing with tighter budgets and greater 
limitations upon resources (Home Office, 2011). Added to this the Home Office provided for the 
national roll out of a non-emergency number to help support the police and public deal with many 
of the nuisance and non-emergency reported each year. This was nothing new. Flanagan (2008) had 
reported the need for additional services to deal with non-emergency calls, stating that police forces 
in England and Wales received as many as 67 million calls per year, many of which (he said) were 
inappropriate. Prior to Flanagan’s findings the Home Office (2006) had stated that many of the calls 
received by local police forces tied up officers on calls of a non-emergency nature, which officers 
could do little about at that time, and thus provided little in the way of satisfaction (for the officer or 
the member of the public).  
It is inevitable that such a magnitude of calls will affect the service that any local police authority can 
deliver. Thus, the development of a non-emergency provision would seem to make a great deal of 
sense, and evidence from local police forces would seemed to support such a need (HMIC, 2014). 
For example, it has been estimated that in some parts of the country (the county of Essex providing 
one such example), as much as 10 percent of the calls are considered inappropriate calls to an 
emergency number, and approximately 70 percent of this number could be considered non-
emergency calls. These calls tend to fall into one of four categories: (1) inappropriate service 
requests – a community safety matter that is a non-emergency; (2) offensive and abusive service 
calls – such as calls from intoxicated members of the public; (3) irrelevant service request – such as 
train timetable requests; and (4) incorrect or inaccurate call – such as the failure to lock a mobile 
telephone keypad (Lewis, 2008). Thus, in 2010 the government set out to establish a national non-
emergency number to help ease the pressures placed upon the public services (McKenna, Smith, 
Williams, Gardner, 2012), and to differentiate between immediate need and non-emergency. 
If the call is from a member of the public who is a victim of crime, suffered threatening and/or racial 
intimidation, witnessed a crime, or has been injured as a result of criminal action, then these calls 
are more than a nuisance, and require immediate and dedicated public safety service. The police are 
under pressure to respond as quickly as possible, as these calls are important to the public. The 
police then are in an impossible position. They are expected to respond to every call, deal with and 
record the details of the problem – where relevant, and if possible, send an officer(s) to the location 
specified by the member of the public. With limited resources and spending cuts an ever present 
concern, a limited number of police officers cannot treat every call as an emergency. It is with this in 
mind that a single non-emergency number was implemented, and subsequently reviewed in this 
study.  
The Literature  
The development of a single non-emergency number, known as SNEN-101, is based on what has 
been referred to as the 311 ‘Chicago Way’ (Home Office, 2004: 59). This number originally started in 
Baltimore, Maryland in 1996 and quickly spread to a number of other states throughout the U.S. and 
Canada. As a service, 311 was set up to provide local people with a 24/7 non-emergency number 
which they could call instead of dialling the 911 emergency code.  
This ‘idea’ was also the draw for many in public safety, and the development of the single non-
emergency 101 number in England and Wales. Concerned with the fear of crime and low level 
disorder the New Labour government published a white paper, Building Communities, Beating Crime 
(2004) that highlighted the impact that litter, tipping of un-wanted rubbish, graffiti and anti-social 
behaviour could have on the local environment and quality of life for residents and local 
communities. It is appropriate to note at this juncture that while the focus in this paper remains the 
use of a single non-emergency number, other community safety initiatives were developed at this 
time as well. The Police Reform Act 2002 introduced Community Support Officers (CSOs) and Local 
Authority Wardens (LAW), employed to patrol premises and/or the ‘street’ in an attempt to reduce 
the incident and fear of crime (Home Office 2002; Newburn, 2002). The core principles guiding the 
introduction of such officers was to deal with non-confrontational issues with the public, providing a 
uniformed visible patrol, responding to anti-social behaviour, and to deal with low level crime and 
quality of life issues (Home Office, 2008).  
This approach has been questioned however. For example, Pamment and Ellis (2010) illustrated that 
young people have little to no respect for CSOs and saw them as nothing more than ‘hobby bobbies’ 
that lacked the requisite power to arrest them. This is an interesting finding similarly reflected in 
Mawby and Wright (2010) and Paskell (2007), and previously associated with Fielding’s work, in 
which he noted that even within the service, community officers were often seen as ‘baby kissers’ 
(1994: 58). In contrast, others (see for example Johnson, 2005/2007; Bain, Robinson, and Conser, 
2014) have stated that any ‘police type’ presence on the street can reduce fear of crime and anxiety 
of victimization, and thus increase public confidence. It was in this context that the Home Office 
recommended the development of a single non-emergency number (Home Office, 2004: 46-58), as 
low-level disorder increasingly became such a sensitive political issue (Raco, 2007; Squires, 2006).  
The first stage for the development of SNEN-101 was a public consultation exercise in 2005. From 
this consultation, as with all public exercises, the issues were wide and varied, reflecting personal 
matters, condensed into eight core priorities: noisy neighbours, vandalism, littering, abandoned 
vehicles, intimidation and harassment, anti-social behaviour, drug-use and/or drunkenness in public 
places, and street lighting.  
However, it is questionable whether all of these ‘priorities’ constitute non-emergency. For example, 
it would be a legitimate argument to suggest that intimidation and harassment are examples of 
offences which could be seen as needing an immediate response, particularly if racial or sexual in 
nature. Indeed, we would argue the same is true when vandalism, property damage, and/or 
substance misuse, present a legitimate fear, or danger to public safety.  
In March 2006 the first general press statement was released which confirmed 101 as the single 
non-emergency number for the public to call regarding incidents of community safety. The vision, 
similar to Chicago, was that the police and local authorities would work side-by-side in an effort to 
reduce the fear of crime and improve public confidence (Home Office, 2006), and the subsequent 
Home Office evaluation of the pilot study found that SNEN-101 had improved public access and 
satisfaction. It was felt that such a service helped the police and local authorities to target their 
resources more effectively and efficiently and deliver services to the public. However, and perhaps 
somewhat surprising, the funding was withdrawn for SNEN-101 in November 2007 even though the 
feedback remained positive. This is even more confusing when the Home Office claimed that such an 
approach led to an increase in the number of calls for SNEN-101 - from 25 percent to 45 percent 
(Home Office, 2008). Additionally, as public use increased, the local police constabularies were able 
to gather further information, thus providing for a more accurate picture of public demand (and 
‘community intelligence’). Even though this was the case, the original budget of £400 million was 
reduced by 50 percent, perhaps a reflection of developing demands on limited resources, including 
the heightened awareness of terrorist attacks (in London, 2007), and the declining national and 
global financial stability of 2008-2011.  
Sir Ronnie Flanagan (2008), then Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, thought the 
development of a single non-emergency number had been a positive move by making for a more 
effective partnership working, whilst also providing clear evidence of mutual benefit to the public. In 
part benefits can be seen in a rise in the numbers of calls, which would seem to indicate an increase 
in public confidence in the service – and the police more generally. It would also suggest that the 
implication of such a service was seen to be legitimate, if not necessary, and again shows a general 
sense of public consent for such programs. Regardless, a ministerial decision was taken to reduce 
the operational funding of SNEN-101.  
In January 2008, and with little warning the Home Office decided to re-launch SNEN-101, but with 
the financial onus placed upon local authorities and police forces to find the necessary funding to 
continue the service. However, the pilot areas had employed different approaches to the service 
from the start, resulting in a variety of different ways in which the single non-emergency number 
developed. For example, in wave one (beginning in June 2006), covering 10 percent of the 
population of England and Wales, all counties worked to a common service blueprint. There were 
however local differences within these counties on the ‘concept of operations.’ In South Yorkshire 
they used existing police premises without a switchboard layer; in Hampshire they used existing 
police premises, but with a switchboard; South Wales built a standalone centre, and Northumbria 
used a network of existing police and local authority centres.  
Out of these different approaches only two became well established services following the pilot; the 
South Wales service is now countrywide and evolved into the Welsh ‘Cymru 101’ service, and the 
Hampshire service moved to a full service for non-emergency 101 early in 2012 (BBC News, 2012), 
solely provided by the local police constabulary. The other services, for a variety of reasons – mostly 
funding issues – service provision was ended.  
Mindful of the immense pressures currently being placed on all service agencies, it is perhaps timely 
to review the usefulness of a single non-emergency number, as there was some evidence of success. 
For example, Samuel (2008b) reported that approximately 750,000 calls had been received by local 
forces since its launch, of which 8 percent were considered issues of anti-social behaviour and 
community safety. This may seem a small number, but this 8 percent claimed that they would not 
have called any organisation for help, but the existence of 101 encouraged them to call. Indeed, data 
presented by McKenna, et al. (2012), suggests by the time of the national roll-out in in the summer 
of 2012 an estimated 2.5 million calls had been placed to SNEN-101, and in a speech to delegates at 
the International Crime & Policing Conference (January 2015), the Home Secretary stated that the 
SNEN-101 number ‘now’ receives 2.5 million calls per month (May, 2015).  
It is important to keep these points in mind, when reflecting upon other social/welfare services. A 
pilot study of ‘111’, a non-emergency number (based on the 101 service), providing coverage  
for non-emergency health care, was shown to allow the NHS to deal with serious, emergency life-
threatening cases instead of non-emergency incidents (Murphy, Alty, and Brewer, 2008). 
Additionally, a similar study undertaken in Wales found positive results when pilot studies were 
assessed in both 2010 and 2012 (Griffiths, 2014). This perhaps emphasizes the validity of such an 
approach, with a health service similarly under pressure to reduce the burden of calls on its limited 
resources and to increasingly save funds while providing a universal service to the public.  
The national roll out of SNEN-101 was seen as a useful way to reduce the burden on the police. 
Furthermore, the ease of access can produce a domino effect, where in addition to the cost saving, 
the delivery of services and reduced police deployments can also provide for the positive effect of 
supporting positive relationships between the police force and local communities. As we noted 
earlier, Tankebe (2013) stated that the public’s perception of policing can be, and often is, effected 
by the perceived and actual access to information and services provided by the police. To this Bain, 
et al. (2014), have added that the ability of officers to do their jobs may – at least in part – be 
predicated upon by the important role played by the perception of fairness in policing held by local 
communities. Both of these views would seem to support the argument that this (non-emergency) 
service can increase public satisfaction by providing a ‘good’ ‘customer’ experience, which in turn 
increases the confidence in the police and ultimately reduces the numbers of non-emergency and 
inappropriate calls (Samuel, 2008b, Bain, et al., 2014). With this in mind we present the findings of 
our research into the usefulness of the SNEN-101 number in one region in England.  
Methodology  
As in the study undertaken by McKenna, et al. (2012), this research made use of a mixed 
methodological approach. In recent years a mixed methodology has enjoyed a rise in its use and 
stature within methodological discussions, and in a variety of fields of investigation, and criminal 
justice and public safety services should be no different. Indeed, Borkan (2004: 4) has stated that the 
use of a multi-methodological approach serves to ‘…allow the investigator to address practice and 
policy issues from the point of view of both numbers and narratives’. In this study we made use of 
semi-structured interviews and an analysis of call data provided by the local region – concentrating 
on volume and type of calls.  
In total 50 individuals were interviewed, and included police officers (of varying rank), community 
safety officers, local councillors, and elected officials. Our data analysis primarily focused on the 
need for a 24/7 service, in which the public had the opportunity to make contact with a human 
(person) when the need arose, and contrasts recent suggestions made by the Home  
Secretary (May, 2015), that good use could be made of electronic reporting systems in order to save 
money and speed up the process. In conducting our research we made direct reference in our 
analysis to:  
 the need for a single non-emergency number  
 cost effectiveness  
 increased information and intelligence around local issues  
 partnership working  
 
In order to consider the better capture of data, the assessment concentrated on the ‘believed’ 
increased and effective information and intelligence from having a single non-emergency number 
and produced a cost-benefit-saving analysis, and in order to substantiate this ‘believed’ effectiveness 
we obtained and reviewed the existing available data regarding crime, disorder and community 
safety in the region under review.  
Interviews consisted of a number of differing sections: (1) Business case and benefits; (2) Review of 
the operating phase; (3) plans for ongoing improvement and value for money; and, (4) performance 
and target management and evaluation. Each section consisted of a range of questions, with 
prepared prompts, presented as a Likert Scale. However, we also provided an additional section in 
which the respondent could provide a personal statement to go along with that provided on a Likert 
scale.  
The decision was taken to examine the data from the Likert Scale using frequency and descriptive 
analysis only. This decision was taken as we did not want to detract from the richness of the 
individual statements made, and thus decided against a full statistical analysis.  
Findings  
In the first place individual stakeholders were invited to make a statement regarding their feelings, 
knowledge and understanding of the SNEN-101, as a system of operation and future direction.  
Answers varied across a broad spectrum, as was to be expected as the feedback was taken from 
individual experience and knowledge of the service. However, negative feedback did not account for 
a (significantly) higher proportion than that of positive feedback. Indeed, a number of positive 
comments standout and support the wider findings of the research programme. For instance the 
comment was made that:  
“We wanted to be part of it [101]… Members had ‘complaints’ from the public about anti-social 
behaviour, and believed 101 was the answer to their concerns, for example when people couldn’t get 
an ‘instant copper’.” (Interview: 103).  
In a similar vein, interviewee 303 stated that:  
“It has gone beyond the 4-5 ASB incident types. In practice it helps [us] manage a high level of ‘fear 
of crime’ and high reporting of incidence here”.  
Figure 1: Is there a requirement or need to provide a 24/7 SNEN-101 service?  
 
When asked if a need existed to provide SNEN-101 on a 24/7 basis, 80 percent of those interviewed 
(40 people) said that they felt there was a need for a 24 hour service to be provided over a 7 day 
week (Figure 1 above). One respondent made it clear when they stated that “Although there is 0845 
for police issues, we couldn’t provide 24/7 without 101”.  
Only 6 percent of those interviewed (3 people) did not think there was a requirement for a 24/7 
service, stating that it was either an unnecessary expense or already covered by the police, the 
remaining 14 percent of interviewees (7 people) were unsure whether such a service was needed – 
providing comments such as:  
“The service is undoubtedly helpful, but what it adds that we didn’t already have… I’m not sure. 
There are a number of ways to deal with the issues, and perhaps it is only at night that there really is 
a need”.  
In essence this would suggest that the willingness to provide a 24/7 service was by and large, a 
popular view, regardless of the employment, position, or profession of the interviewees. However, 
when asked if they felt that SNEN-101 was a cost effective way of providing for a 24/7 service, the 
opinion was far more mixed.  
Figure 2: SNEN-101 is a cost effective way of providing a 24/7 service  
 
As figure 2 shows (above), a large number of people questioned were unsure of its cost 
effectiveness, and is perhaps reflective of the views of those who were unsure of its value as a 24 
hour service. 58 percent (29 participants) were neutral and fell into the ‘don’t know’ category. The 
‘value’ of SNEN-101 becomes more questionable however, when those that saw the service as not 
cost effective were added. In fact, 18 percent (9 participants) believed that SNEN-101 was not cost 
effective (at all). This may be a reflection of peoples’ concern over the cost implications to local 
councils, though. For example, although positive about the service as a whole, one respondent said:  
“It is difficult to run because of the uncertain nature of 101 – how permanent it is… We are unsure of 
local position on 101. Therefore, it remains difficult to manage”. Where does the money come from, 
and could that money be better placed?” (Interview: 207).  
Finally, positive answers accounted for just 24 percent (12 people) of the total figures.  
While still providing for a more positive than negative view of the service, in this question there is 
obvious concern regarding the large number of people who were unsure of its value. Of all issues 
raised the withdrawal of full funding from the Home Office, was one of the most important, and was 
(undoubtedly) problematic for the pilot schemes. Here, more so than anywhere else it may be 
important to ensure that stakeholders have all of the relevant information regarding the service 
provision and the outcomes from the work undertaken.  
The speed of implementation also created problems in some areas in terms of planning, and 
securing effective, political and financial support. It is important to understand the implementation 
issues in the context of the various diverse organisations involved in the partnerships - including 
understanding the differences in the levels of knowledge and working practices. This is a recurring 
issue for community safety partnerships, and not one particular to a specific region. Indeed, 
Crawford (1998), Hughes and Edwards (2002), Newburn (2002), and Tilley (2005) have noted similar 
issues raised as a consequence of other local and governmental initiatives.  
Arguably, the ‘fast-time’ introduction in 2006, and subsequent changes (withdrawal and re-initiation 
of service) is the cause of much trouble for this region. Due to such a speedy implementation local 
issues were perhaps not explored as well as they might otherwise have been. This was a common 
theme throughout the research, in which many of the respondents felt that SNEN-101 was a political 
innovation rather than a serious attempt to deal with community safety, and as a consequence had 
an ad hoc approach to its implementation.  
A number of questions were designed to understand how ‘data’ captured was used in dealing with 
issues of community safety. For example, respondents were asked if they felt that SNEN- 101 had 
increased information and intelligence around local issues.  
Figure 3: Has SNEN-101 contributed to increased information and intelligence around local issues?  
 
The feedback provided by participants suggests an extremely positive view with regards to the 
contribution made by SNEN-101 to support an increase in information and intelligence gathering 
(see figure 3 – above), and the following statements were broadly typical of feedback received from 
practitioners:  
“Practitioners are very supportive as 101 has given an extra amount of local information and 
enhances services” (Interview: 506).  
and  
“101 is about being out there. 101 gives us lots of information and lots of local intelligence we didn’t 
have. This is what we have been waiting for” (Interview: 201).  
In all, 72 percent (36 people) said that they felt SNEN-101 had provided for better information and 
intelligence concerning local issues and events, with only 28 percent saying that there were unsure 
(14 respondents), and 8 percent clearly saying it provided no ‘new’ intelligence at all (4 people).  
The data generated by the local Police Authority suggested that there was a continued growth of 
information and intelligence around specific activities, which could then be used to further improve 
the effective deployment of resources, and adding value in terms of the time and resource savings. 
For example, during the 18 month period of research, SNEN-101 was frequently used to report 
incidences of rowdyism (28%); harassment (20%); noise (19%); abandoned vehicles (9%); vandalism 
(6%); and drunken behaviour (5%). Drugs, graffiti, fly-tipping, etc. were all at or below 2%, which 
show a mixed need for both community safety and environmental health action.  
Such ‘information’ was welcomed by all parties, particularly by the police, reiterating the position 
that the data helped with deployment of limited resources, increasingly important with pending cuts 
to provision of public service (Travis, 2015). Indeed, it seems that in recent years there has been a 
cut to public spending in policing and associated services with each budget, and – as part of a cost-
cutting exercise – has most recently seen the Home Secretary announce that local police chiefs 
should have a greater ability to redistribute funds as appropriate (Travis, 2015).  
There was however, a worryingly negative view of the ability of SNEN-101 to provide for improved 
partnership working. The response is one that is familiar to research on partnership working 
(Crawford, 1998; Gilling and Barton, 1997; Gilling, 1997; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Hughes, 
McLaughlin, and Muncie, 2002; and Tilley, 2005), and further outlined in Graph 1 - below.  
Graph 1: Has 101 Improved Partnership Working?  
 
The evidence provided in Graph 1 shows that in the largest group (the majority if you will), 48 
percent (24 people), felt that there were no improvements in the ways in which partnerships were 
working. 38 percent (19 interviewees) were more positive about the ways in which partnerships 
were working, but this may have been individuals that previously felt they had little input to the 
partnership or lacked information exchange in the past. Most of the people interviewed answered 
this question from the point of view of the ‘agency’ they were employed by. This is understandable, 
but there was little reflection on how the problem(s) of working with another ‘agency’ affected the 
partnership more generally. This was a clear indication of how people measured success and what 
each factor meant and the terms of the outcome.  
For example, while 48 percent said that they did not feel that SNEN-101 had provided for a better 
working relationship, the consensus from our interviews was that ‘good’ working relationship’s 
already existed prior to SNEN-101 and so had little impact on working relationships. Indeed, one 
respondent stated that:  
“101 has made no contribution to partnership working here. All agencies meet every 2 weeks any 
way to discuss a range of problems – community safety is always one of them”. (Interview: 204)  
However, the provision of improving partnership working is a key factor in the success of SNEN-101 
(and any community safety initiative) and its ability to achieve cost savings, increase access and 
delivery of local services, with a reduction in non-emergency calls to the police. Dealing effectively 
with the expectation and satisfaction of the general public are further important areas in discussions 
of success, and vital – if there is a consideration to maintain any community safety service.  
As a final check, stakeholders were asked if they felt that partnership working had improved through 
the introduction of a single non-emergency number, and answers were proportionately balanced. 
Although the tendency leaned toward the positive, only 2 percent (1 interviewee) strongly agreed 
with the statement, 34 percent (17 interviewees) overall felt that partnership working had improved 
in some way. Where 32 percent (16 interviewees) disagreed – to some extent. This is further 
highlighted below in figure 4: partnership working has improved through a SNEN-101.  
Figure 4: Partnership working has improved through a SNEN-101  
 
This is a worrying trend, because if the stakeholders have little belief in the service it would seem to 
be even harder to sell it to the public as a strong alternative to them using the emergency-999 
number. A position made more concerning with the statement by the Home Secretary that could see 
community officers and volunteers given greater powers in an effort to reduce policing budgets still 
further (Dodd, 2015).  
Significantly, when asked to comment upon the transformational cost savings stakeholders were 
again split in their findings and understanding, and thus lacked any positive support.  
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Has SNEN-101 provided for transformational cost savings and efficiencies?  
 
10 percent of participants (5 people) stated that they did not know of transformational cost savings, 
and a further 24 percent (12 participants) were not sure. The final, and by far the largest group, 66 
percent (33 individuals) said that they believed that SNEN-101 had not provided for any 
transformational cost savings. Although a little concerning, it is not surprising. For instance, many 
stakeholders felt that there was a great deal of duplication from individual service providers in 
regards to SNEN-101, and that in order to reduce/transform cost, the use of SNEN-101, needed full 
support from the Home Office, which – amid all the cost savings and budget reductions was never 
really certain, or guaranteed. However, senior officers seemed more positive of the service. For 
example, one senior police officer commented that:  
“As an additional policing service it helps – a lot. It frees us up to deal with things of a life-
threatening nature… We are able to respond as it [crime] happens – it is proactive rather than 
reactive (Interview: 201). Another added that:  
“We learn about more problems and we are able to intervene more often” (Interview: 507).  
Discussion  
It appears that a single non-emergency number is a worthwhile scheme, popular with both the 
public (Home Office, 2006) and senior politicians. However, if a single non-emergency number is to 
be successful, questions of its cost effectiveness need to be resolved. The issue of  
cost-effectiveness is – inevitably – open to some interpretation. Most of those interviewed saw cost 
as a single issue relevant to them if they were expected to contribute greater funding to the running 
of the service as policing budgets were reduced, or budgets redirected. The majority of those 
interviewed thought it a worthwhile service (80%) but continued to question its worth once the 
issue of funding the service arose. Indeed, we have some sympathy for this expression, since from 
the start the funding for SNEN-101 has been inconsistent, making it difficult for ‘regions’ to plan 
ahead and make a sound proposal. If the intention is to provide a single non-emergency number into 
the future, the funding streams available to local areas must be made clear.  
Furthermore, SNEN-101 brought knowledge and intelligence of the local community to the attention 
of the police. Such knowledge of a local community, its social problems, its demographics, etc. are 
invaluable when providing such service(s), particularly in reference to such emotive issues as crime 
and community safety. The single non-emergency number is thus of great use – if not importance. 
Perhaps one of the greatest divisions between authorities and the local community, is the lack of 
communication, or negative interactions (Bain, et al., 2014), and SNEN-101 is capable of satisfying 
this and many other aims. A single non-emergency number will, for example, reduce calls to 
emergency only numbers like ‘999’; provide public reassurance that something is being done to 
tackle crime/anti-social behaviour; and increase access to services.  
However, there are the problems that arise as a direct result of the evidence presented here. In the 
first place, positive affirmation only follows positive action, and part of that is communication. We 
raise this here, because of recent suggests made that ‘cost savings’ could be made through the use 
of automated and/or electronic reporting services, where victims would be asked to report crime via 
the internet (May, 2015). Evidence from innumerable studies would seem to suggest that the 
comfort provided by human contact can help to repair the damage caused through experiencing 
crime as a victim – no matter the crime. Indeed, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP, 2010: 3) has stated that:  
Law enforcement personnel have vital roles to play in responding to and supporting victims 
of crime. Crime victims are key stakeholders… [who] hold unique perspectives, valuable 
insights, active interest in the problem, and strong feelings about criminal behavior. 
Responding effectively and appropriately to all victims is not only the right thing to do… but it 
is also in law enforcement’s best interest.  
The question then is just how much will be saved, if the net result is a requirement to redeploy 
services in other areas where evidence, intelligence or community support is lost.  
A single non-emergency number will only help those ‘responsible’ members of the public who call 
regarding matters of community safety and anti-social behaviour rather than for some irrelevant 
and/or insignificant personal reason. The non-emergency number can be advertised, and the public 
can be educated to use it, but only if they are willing to listen. In England, at least, there is perhaps a 
section of the public that will still call the emergency services for the most trivial matters. These calls 
will on the basis of past experience still happen, even following development of a (national) single 
non-emergency number, and a high profile campaign, and there are a number of reasons for this. In 
the first place, what one believes is trivial is all consuming to another. For example, what begins as a 
single event of a trivial nature, can quickly deteriorate into a perceived threat to personal space if 
the behaviour continues – noisy neighbours, groups of youth hanging around in parks and 
community spaces, are just some examples. Similarly, it must be remembered that after more than 
70 years of using the emergency 999 number, the U.K. might find that it will take some time before 
the public calls the relevant and appropriate number for entirely the right reason.  
In support of the findings of Bain, et al. (2014), McKenna, et al. (2012), and Samuel (2008b) 
discussed previously, we were able to confirm that a police presence on the streets (of any type) 
helped reduce the fear of crime to some extent, which in turn only further supported the evidence 
for SNEN-101 acting to provide invaluable information to the police on what was ‘happening’ on the 
housing estates and local streets. In this example it seems that SNEN-101 is a valuable/valued 
service, which needs careful support and evaluation over time in order to improve the service and 
provide the general public with the level of support they demand. We believe that much more time 
and effort should be put into the investigation of this and other similar services, in order to continue 
to improve the already increasingly positive relationship between local communities, policing 
agencies and local authorities.  
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